イタリーの経済
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Italy Five Star Movement has risen to global prominence more for the colorful oddness of its founder, the comedian Beppe Grillo, than for the seriousness of its populist policies.
But one of its proposals has attracted genuine interest from across the world: The idea of a citizens income.This concept (a less radical version of the universal basic income scheme tried out by Finland) could in theory appealツto both the left and the right;ツthe former because it might reduce inequality, and the latter because it could simplify social security.
After a long gestation, Five Star is rolling out its plan in Italy. Unfortunately, the plan has little of the revolutionary spirit of Milton Friedman窶冱 idea for a simple guaranteed basic income for all citizens, jobless or not, and is more like a classic welfare-to-work program. After a deep recession and weak recovery, there窶冱 a strong case for helping Italy left-behind. The worrying thing is that this experiment becomesツan administrative nightmare, making it harder to target those most in need.
Italy's new citizens whose income is for households earning less than 9,360 euros ($10,612) a year. It made up of an income support scheme and a housing allowance, which can add up to 780 euros a month for a single person with no income.ツIt is aimed at pensioners and people of working age. The latter must be willing to accept a suitable job, or else lose the benefit hence its difference to more radical basic income schemes.ツCompanies will get a discount on their social security contributions when they hire a citizens' income recipient.
The country clearly needs to help its poor. About one-fifth of its citizens are at risk of poverty, according to the country窶冱ツstatisticsツagency, and one in ten lives with serious deprivation. This is worse than in 2008, when the figures stood at 18.9 percent and 7.5 percent respectively. Previous center-left governments passed a different support scheme, but it was far smaller than Five Star窶冱 program.
Yet the new plan risks targeting the wrong people. The two most vulnerable groups in Italy are foreigners and families with lots of children. A household with at least one foreign-born member is almost twice as likely to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion than one where everyone was born in Italy. Similarly, families with five or more members are at far greater risk than smaller households.
Only people resident in Italy for at least 10 years can receive the citizens income, though. And while the support for a household of one is very generous, the additional money paid out for each child is proportionately less than before. A family with five children will get essentially the same amount as one with three. This keeps down the cost of the Five Star plan, but it risks penalizing the most needy.
Administration is another serious obstacle. Italy's job centers are famously inefficient, particularly those in the poorer south. The government wants to recruitツthousands of new workers for them,ツbut it will take years to get the new structure running properly. The citizens' income is expected to kick off from the spring, when many new hires won have been recruited or trained properly.
Finally, there is a real problem with compliance. The scheme is most generous for those who claim they earn nothing. This includes the poorest but also tax avoiders. And since Italy has a real problem with revenue cheats, the state needs to toughen up its enforcement hugely to make sure they don prosper. The new checksツappear burdensome, especially for money held in current accounts where controls will clash with privacy. And there a danger of tens of thousands of work relationships slipping into the black economy, so workers can get the benefit while earning an undeclared wage.
Five Star certainly deserves credit for trying to addressツpoverty in Italy in a way other parties haven done. But the urgent timetable and state of Italy's bureaucracy risk making it a waste of funds. Not a great thing in a country that has to beツextremely careful about howツit spends taxpayers7 money.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
Ferdinando Giugliano writes columns and editorials on European economics for Bloomberg Opinion. He is also an economics columnist for La Repubblica and was a member of the editorial board of the Financial Times.
ツゥ2019 Bloomberg L.P.
5つ星とLeagueの連立政権が発足早々、ローマで反政府デモが起こった(2018-11-1)。
ナショナリスト政権になっても事態は改善されず。国家予算の枠が狭く、政府が独自の政策を行えない。ローマやナポリといった観光都市の浄化すら思うに任せない。イタリーは経済的に疲弊しきった国家になってしまっているのである。なぜそうなったかは簡単に説明できないがベルルスコーニのような悪徳政治家が長年政権を握っていたことも大きな理由である。大衆は彼の悪質さに気が付かないうちに彼に政治を任せていた。
改善を妨害するEU委員会のネオリベラリズム官僚群である。
Protests and strikes signal mounting hostility toward Italian government
A wave of strikes and protests across Italy this month reflects widespread and increasing hostility toward the coalition Five Star Movement-Lega government and increasing concerns over the rapidly deteriorating standard of living for the vast majority of Italians.
This past Saturday, nearly 10,000 Romans marched to protest against the crumbling infrastructure in Italy’s capital city. The protest, organised by a group of women that founded Roma Dice Basta (Rome Says Enough), put forward demands for Rome to return to a city that is “inclusive, liveable, welcoming, and forward thinking.”
There is widespread disgust for Rome’s mayor, Virginia Raggi of the Five Star Movement, who was elected on an anti-establishment campaign with promises to clean up the city and significantly improve its infrastructure, but has been mired in scandal since taking office and hasn’t fulfilled any of her election promises. Raggi was indicted last month on charges of making false statements regarding the appointment of Renato Marra as director of Rome’s tourism department.
Residents and visitors are rightly shocked that garbage has been left to pile up, to the point that rats and wild boar regularly feast on the fetid mess, and that maintenance and improvement of transport services has been all but abandoned, with 35 percent of the bus and tram fleet out of commission and at least 30 buses in the city’s aging fleet catching fire between 2017 and 2018.
Rome’s problems, however, began many years ago, and since the onset of the 2008 world financial crisis, the city has been faced with increasing challenges as its administrators have either sought to find short-term solutions or been involved in shady financial derivative transactions that have further deepened the Eternal City’s budgetary crisis.
Contrary to the common mantra echoed by the servile media that workers as well as inept administrators are the main cause of Rome’s budget imbalances, the role of finance capital and derivative schemes is largely responsible for Rome’s—and Italy’s—crisis. Raggi is merely a continuation of this trend.
The protest in Rome followed on the heels of a 24-hour “Black Friday” general strike by public sector workers in transportation, hospitals, and schools across Italy who walked off the job in protest over “salary, welfare, representation in the workplace, universal rights, against privatisation and liberalisation, the abolition of inequalities, and health and safety.”
The four largest unions (USI, CUB, SGB, COBAS), sensing unrest among their membership, put forward workers’ requests for “real increases in pay, provisions for sufficient staff, respect for the dignity of staff, and the right to retirement at 60 or with 35 years of contributions.”
Since the 2012 Jobs Act, pushed through by the Democratic Party, public sector workers have faced increasingly harsh conditions. Citizens interviewed by local media outlets on the day of the strike were overwhelmingly sympathetic with the strikers, even as they expressed frustration over service interruptions.
Last month’s protests and strikes took place as the coalition government continued its crackdown on immigration and submits the latest austerity national budget for approval by the European Union (EU).
While there is widespread concern among Italians about immigration, there is also mass sympathy for the plight of immigrants and an understanding that the significant increase in immigration is due to the unending wars and economic destruction abroad.
Last week, upon visiting the site in Rome where a young woman was allegedly murdered by a group of Italian and immigrant men, Lega Party leader Matteo Salvini was met by hundreds of protesters who roundly jeered him as a “jackal” for taking political advantage of human tragedy to further vilify immigrants.
At the beginning of October, nearly 6,000 people demonstrated in Riace (southern Italy), Rome and Milan, to denounce the arrest of Riace’s immigrant-friendly mayor and the “fascist” anti-immigrant policies of the coalition government. Contrary to the government’s accusation that Riace’s immigrants represent a threat to Italy, the town’s immigrant policies are widely viewed as a role model for how immigrants can be integrated into society.
As the Italian government builds up a vast police state apparatus to carry out mass deportations of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, it is implementing further austerity through the latest national budget that pledges billions of euros for the military and the police, and tax breaks for businesses, while promising a miserly €780 per month “basic income” for Italian citizens, which comes with so many strings attached that it will be virtually impossible to qualify.
On October 24, the WSWS noted that a violent struggle is set to unfold on the summits of European bourgeois politics, as both pro-EU and far-right populist forces fight to impose their version of austerity while trying to avert a financial panic that could provoke an Italian and global market crash. The central question is a perspective for independent political opposition by the working class, uniting workers’ struggles against austerity in Italy and across Europe.
5つ星運動と反移民同盟=Leagueが連合政権を形成することになった。これに前のSivio Berluscconi(ベルルスコーニ)が加わるという。どちらの政党も過半数を得ていない。5つ星は「反汚職」をッスローガンに掲げてきて第1党になった。32%の得票率を得たが過半数にはほど遠い。しかし、他の政党も5つ星をいれなければ組閣できない。ベルルスコーニのForza Itariaも14%の得票を得ている。LeagueのリーダーMatteo Salviniは44歳の若さである。President Sergio Mattarella,は組閣の協議を始めた。Luigi Di Maio, the 5 Star’s 31-year-old leaderは少数政権でもかまわないといっている。結局、5つ星とLeagueの連合政権が成立する。(2018-3-5)
Italy
Faces Political Paralysis After Populist Jolt
The
antiestablishment 5 Star Movement and a center-right coalition each claim to
have the right to try to form a government
By Eric Sylvers
and Marcus Walker
Updated March 5,
2018 8:50 a.m. ET
ROME—Italy entered
a period of political instability on Monday after national elections boosted
populists but failed to produce a winner with enough support to patch together
a parliamentary majority.
Sunday’s two big winners—the
5 Star Movement and a center-right coalition including former premier Silvio
Berlusconi and the anti-immigrant League—each claimed Monday to have won enough
support to earn the right to try to form a government. However, with neither
group having won an outright majority, Italy is likely to face weeks or months
of consultations among the parties.
With 98% of votes
counted early Monday, the antiestablishment 5 Star Movement was projected to
win 32% of the vote—exceeding expectations and emerging as Italy’s largest
party.
The 5 Star
Movement, which has won a large following by denouncing Italy’s conventional
politicians as corrupt, has long been hostile to the idea of forming governing
pacts with other parties. Despite some signs of greater flexibility recently,
many observers believe a government led by the movement will be difficult to
assemble.
“Nobody can govern without the 5 Star,” Riccardo
Fraccaro, a leading party member, told a news conference after the vote.
On paper, the 5
Star could form a government with the League. Such a populist coalition, which
would shock Italy’s and Europe’s establishment and possibly challenge European
Union rules on economic policy, faces political hurdles, however, given major
differences between the parties’ ideology and political strategies up to now.
The 5 Star’s
growth, and the fact that antiestablishment parties won just over half of all
votes, are likely to raise concerns in the EU about the strength of
anti-incumbency feeling in one of the bloc’s founder members.
The conservative
coalition was projected to win about 37% of the vote, falling short of a
majority in either chamber of parliament. Mr. Berlusconi’s Forza Italia emerged
as one of the big losers on the night, getting 14% of the vote, about four
points less than its main ally, the League.
What Is Italy’s 5
Star Movement?
Europe’s Fragile
Center Takes New Blows
Investors Ignore
Italian Politics. At Their Peril?
What Happens Next
After Italian Vote
That puts Matteo
Salvini, the 44-year-old leader of the League, in the driver’s seat as the
alliance contemplates its next moves.
Weeks and possibly
months of wrangling beckon before Italy has a government. Failure to form any
stable administration, leading to repeat elections, is also possible.
The new parliament will meet for the first time on March 23, after which
Italy’s head of state, President Sergio Mattarella, will begin consultations
with parties to see if it any majority can be put together.
Predictions of
populist, eurosceptic victories ahead of major European elections last year
didn’t fully materialize—but Italy is different. WSJ’s Niki Blasina explains
why the March 4 election in the eurozone’s third-largest economy could have
serious repercussions for the European Union. (Originally Published February
27, 2018)
Traditionally, the
first shot at forming a government has gone to the biggest party, which has
normally coincided with the biggest electoral alliance. This time, it isn’t
clear how Mr. Mattarella will handle the competing claims of the center-right
alliance and the 5 Star Movement that they should lead the country.
Mr. Salvini said
Monday the center-right coalition has won “the right to govern Italy” and ruled
out breaking with the group’s conservative allies in order to strike an
alliance with the 5 Star Movement.
Meanwhile, Luigi Di Maio, the 5 Star’s 31-year-old leader, displayed more
openness to a deal.
In his remarks
Monday to reporters, he said the group is open to dialogue “with all parties.”
Bad Debt Piled in Italian Banks Looms as Next Crisis
イタリーの議会選挙で与党が事実上の敗北。(2013-2-27)
イタリーは雇用法改正ー解雇が容易に(2012-6-28)
マリオ・モンンティ首相の新政策は引き締め強化⇒2011-12-3
イタリーは経済テクノクラートの新首相に交代-暗夜行路の旅(2011-11-22)
イタリーの経済の苦悩2011年まで (2011-11-5)
ギリシャの次はイタリーであるとかスペインであるとかポルトガルであるとか言われている。これらの国に共通する問題はないかというといずれも工業国ではない、もしくは工業部門の弱い国であるということである。それは貿易統計の赤字に表れている。
各国とも繊維や家電で大きな貿易赤字となっているのである。国内では自国で消費する衣類すら十分に生産されずに、その多くを輸入に頼っている。電気製品もテレビ、冷蔵庫、エア・コン、洗濯機からこまごました電気製品を一部を除いて輸入に依存している。
輸入に見合う外貨獲得の手段がほとんどない。観光業ぐらいが外貨収入の道である。ただし、ユーロという「強い通貨」があるので、銀行から金を借りればいくらでも輸入できる。ユーロがなくて従来のような自国通貨(リラ)であったら、それほど自由に輸入できなかったはずである。
ドイツやフランスの銀行にとってはこれらの非(もしくは弱)工業国はまたとない借り手である。これらの政府も税収が上がらないのに社会保障だけは一応やらなければならないし、失業手当にも巨額の支出を要する。税金は消費税で取り立てるのが手っ取り早いからどんどん消費税は上げた。ギリシャでさえ消費税は20%にも達している。
その結果は当然ながら国内消費の減少につながり、不況が慢性化する。それに「引き締め強化」が行われれば経済は窒息する。失業も増える。そんな政策に国民がいつまで耐えられるかが問題である。
表1.イタリーの貿易収支(単位:100万ユーロ)
2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | |
輸出 | 256,626 | 269,770 | 265,837 | 260,649 | 284,413 | 299,923 | 332,013 | 364,744 | 369,018 | 291,733 | 337,810 |
うち域内 | 158,418 | 163,425 | 160,680 | 161,068 | 175,947 | 183,661 | 203,069 | 222,173 | 217,210 | 168,065 | 193,654 |
うち域外 | 98,208 | 106,345 | 105,157 | 99,581 | 108,466 | 116,262 | 128,944 | 142,571 | 151,808 | 123,668 | 144,156 |
輸入 | 254,486 | 259,810 | 257,021 | 257,897 | 285,634 | 309,292 | 352,465 | 373,340 | 382,050 | 297,609 | 367,122 |
うち域内 | 163,874 | 159,332 | 159,957 | 161,392 | 177,575 | 183,847 | 202,859 | 215,453 | 208,784 | 170,868 | 201,531 |
うち域外 | 90,612 | 100,478 | 97,064 | 96,505 | 108,059 | 125,445 | 149,606 | 157,887 | 173,266 | 126,741 | 165,591 |
貿易収支 | 2,140 | 9,960 | 8,816 | 2,752 | -1,221 | -9,369 | -20,452 | -8,596 | -13,032 | -5,876 | -29,312 |
うち域内 | -5,456 | 4,093 | 723 | -324 | -1,628 | -186 | 210 | 6,720 | 8,426 | -2,803 | -7,877 |
うち域外 | 7,596 | 5,867 | 8,093 | 3,076 | 407 | -9,183 | -20,662 | -15,316 | -21,458 | -3,073 | -21,435 |
上の表を見ると、イタリーは2004年までは貿易黒字国であった。2005年から急速に貿易赤字が拡大した。なぜこのようなことになったかといえば、下の中国との貿易で見ればわかるように、繊維や家電製品の輸入が一挙に増えたからである。イタリーの通貨がリラのままであったらこういう現象は多分起こらなかったであろう。ユーロ体制になったがために、1国の貿易バランスがその国の為替に反映されることはなくなった。
中国性の衣類がユーロ建てみれば安いので、衣類の輸入が増加し続けるという現象が起こったのである。家電製品についても同様である。輸入が増え続ければ、その国のその製品の製造は衰微していく。換言すれば繊維産業や家電産業部門の雇用が減少していくのである。
その分ほかの産業分野で雇用が増えれば別に問題はない。しかし、ほとんどの国で雇用機会が増えるということにならなかった。一番雇用吸収力が多いのはサービス業であり、それが「産業構造の変化」かもしれないが、サービス分野だけが雇用を増やすわけにはいかない。それと、サービス分野は一般的に低賃金である。
表2.中国から見たイタリーとの貿易収支(単位;100万ドル、%)
2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | |
輸出 | 3,802 | 3,992 | 4,828 | 6,653 | 9,225 | 11,691 | 15,973 | 21,172 | 26,608 | 20,244 | 31,141 |
うち繊維 | 906 | 882 | 1,066 | 1,407 | 1,768 | 2,851 | 3,485 | 4,071 | 5,226 | 4,601 | 5,772 |
機械・電機 | 836 | 908 | 1,115 | 1,816 | 3,044 | 3,306 | 4,216 | 6,274 | 8,643 | 7,142 | 13,235 |
機械 | 474 | 501 | 631 | 1,010 | 1,659 | 1,698 | 2,053 | 2,987 | 4,542 | 3,277 | 4,728 |
電機 | 362 | 407 | 484 | 806 | 1,385 | 1,608 | 2,163 | 3,287 | 4,101 | 3,865 | 8,507 |
輸送機械 | 144 | 173 | 119 | 245 | 247 | 343 | 613 | 933 | 1,166 | 1,403 | 2,086 |
3品目計 | 1,886 | 1,963 | 2,300 | 3,468 | 5,059 | 6,500 | 8,314 | 11,278 | 15,035 | 13,146 | 21,093 |
(構成比、%) | |||||||||||
うち繊維 | 23.8 | 22.1 | 22.1 | 21.1 | 19.2 | 24.4 | 21.8 | 19.2 | 19.6 | 22.7 | 18.5 |
機械・電機 | 22.0 | 22.7 | 23.1 | 27.3 | 33.0 | 28.3 | 26.4 | 29.6 | 32.5 | 35.3 | 42.5 |
機械 | 12.5 | 12.6 | 13.1 | 15.2 | 18.0 | 14.5 | 12.9 | 14.1 | 17.1 | 16.2 | 15.2 |
電機 | 9.5 | 10.2 | 10.0 | 12.1 | 15.0 | 13.8 | 13.5 | 15.5 | 15.4 | 19.1 | 27.3 |
輸送機械 | 3.8 | 4.3 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 6.9 | 6.7 |
3品目計 | 49.6 | 49.2 | 47.6 | 52.1 | 54.8 | 55.6 | 52.1 | 53.3 | 56.5 | 64.9 | 67.7 |
輸入 | 3,078 | 3,789 | 4,320 | 5,080 | 6,451 | 6,926 | 8,603 | 10,210 | 11,647 | 11,020 | 14,011 |
うち繊維 | 230 | 268 | 302 | 324 | 423 | 496 | 551 | 675 | 839 | 705 | 879 |
機械・電機 | 1,782 | 2,299 | 2,525 | 3,008 | 3,756 | 3,698 | 4,666 | 5,169 | 5,573 | 5,669 | 7,029 |
機械 | 1,334 | 1,770 | 2,102 | 2,501 | 2,959 | 2,908 | 3,464 | 3,600 | 4,351 | 4,407 | 5,745 |
電機 | 448 | 529 | 423 | 507 | 797 | 790 | 1,202 | 1,569 | 1,222 | 1,262 | 1,284 |
輸送機械 | 52 | 47 | 45 | 83 | 74 | 87 | 172 | 499 | 404 | 44 | 472 |
3品目計 | 2,064 | 2,614 | 2,872 | 3,415 | 4,253 | 4,281 | 5,389 | 6,343 | 6,816 | 6,418 | 8,380 |
(構成比、%) | |||||||||||
うち繊維 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 7.2 | 6.4 | 6.6 | 7.2 | 6.4 | 6.3 |
機械・電機 | 57.9 | 60.7 | 58.4 | 59.2 | 58.2 | 53.4 | 54.2 | 50.6 | 47.8 | 51.4 | 50.2 |
機械 | 43.3 | 46.7 | 48.7 | 49.2 | 45.9 | 42.0 | 40.3 | 35.3 | 37.4 | 40.0 | 41.0 |
電機 | 14.6 | 14.0 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 12.4 | 11.4 | 14.0 | 15.4 | 10.5 | 11.5 | 9.2 |
輸送機械 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 4.9 | 3.5 | 0.4 | 3.4 |
3品目計 | 67.1 | 69.0 | 66.5 | 67.2 | 65.9 | 61.8 | 62.6 | 62.1 | 58.5 | 58.2 | 59.8 |
貿易収支 | 724 | 203 | 508 | 1,573 | 2,774 | 4,765 | 7,370 | 10,962 | 14,961 | 9,224 | 17,130 |
うち繊維 | 676 | 614 | 764 | 1,083 | 1,345 | 2,355 | 2,934 | 3,396 | 4,387 | 3,896 | 4,893 |
機械・電機 | -946 | -1,391 | -1,410 | -1,192 | -712 | -392 | -450 | 1,105 | 3,070 | 1,473 | 6,206 |
機械 | -860 | -1,269 | -1,471 | -1,491 | -1,300 | -1,210 | -1,411 | -613 | 191 | -1,130 | -1,017 |
電機 | -86 | -122 | 61 | 299 | 588 | 818 | 961 | 1,718 | 2,879 | 2,603 | 7,223 |
輸送機械 | 92 | 126 | 74 | 162 | 173 | 256 | 441 | 434 | 762 | 1,359 | 1,614 |
3品目計 | -178 | -651 | -572 | 53 | 806 | 2,219 | 2,925 | 4,935 | 8,219 | 6,728 | 12,713 |
(構成比、%) | |||||||||||
うち繊維 | 93.4 | 302.5 | 150.4 | 68.8 | 48.5 | 49.4 | 39.8 | 31.0 | 29.3 | 42.2 | 28.6 |
機械・電機 | -130.7 | -685.2 | -277.6 | -75.8 | -25.7 | -8.2 | -6.1 | 10.1 | 20.5 | 16.0 | 36.2 |
機械 | -118.8 | -625.1 | -289.6 | -94.8 | -46.9 | -25.4 | -19.1 | -5.6 | 1.3 | -12.3 | -5.9 |
電機 | -11.9 | -60.1 | 12.0 | 19.0 | 21.2 | 17.2 | 13.0 | 15.7 | 19.2 | 28.2 | 42.2 |
輸送機械 | 12.7 | 62.1 | 14.6 | 10.3 | 6.2 | 5.4 | 6.0 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 14.7 | 9.4 |
3品目計 | -24.6 | -320.7 | -112.6 | 3.4 | 29.1 | 46.6 | 39.7 | 45.0 | 54.9 | 72.9 | 74.2 |
上の表で見ると、イタリーは中国から繊維と電機(おもに家電製品)の輸入が急増しているが、機械はイタリーの輸出が多いことがわかる。これはイタリーの製鉄機械メカーのダニエリ社が安価で比較的性能もよい製鉄機械を中国に大量に輸出したことが大きく響いている。中国の鉄鋼業は2000年代に各地で大規模な能力拡張を行ったのである。イタリーの自動車メーカーとしてはフィアットが知られるが、フィアットの中国向け輸出はさほど多くはない。
上の表で、イタリーの対中貿易赤字は繊維と電機で約70%である。これをイタリーで国産に置き換えればイタリーの失業率はかなり減少したはずである。同じことはギリシャについてもいえる。要するにイタリーは中国の餌食になっている。
表3、イタリーの国内総支出
2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | |
個人消費 | 7,097 | 7,148 | 7,160 | 7,229 | 7,283 | 7,366 | 7,457 | 7,538 | 7,480 | 7,342 | 7,412 |
政府消費 | 2,236 | 2,323 | 2,381 | 2,427 | 2,483 | 2,530 | 2,543 | 2,567 | 2,581 | 2,607 | 2,592 |
固定投資 | 2,428 | 2,485 | 2,578 | 2,554 | 2,592 | 2,628 | 2,711 | 2,748 | 2,644 | 2,328 | 2,382 |
うち機械 | 1,029 | 1,018 | 1,028 | 1,001 | 1,012 | 1,043 | 1,103 | 1,139 | 1,082 | 919 | 1,008 |
建設 | 1,123 | 1,170 | 1,239 | 1,270 | 1,293 | 1,303 | 1,318 | 1,320 | 1,280 | 1,169 | 1,125 |
運輸 | 276 | 297 | 311 | 282 | 287 | 282 | 291 | 292 | 284 | 235 | 255 |
輸出 | 3,234 | 3,304 | 3,211 | 3,162 | 3,277 | 3,342 | 3,562 | 3,703 | 3,542 | 2,890 | 3,146 |
輸入 | 3,121 | 3,165 | 3,172 | 3,222 | 3,327 | 3,418 | 3,631 | 3,752 | 3,587 | 3,091 | 3,409 |
純輸出 | 113 | 140 | 39 | -60 | -50 | -76 | -69 | -49 | -45 | -201 | -263 |
在庫 | 44 | 30 | 24 | 38 | 45 | 3 | 72 | 85 | 59 | -24 | 78 |
GDE | 11,918 | 12,126 | 12,182 | 12,188 | 12,353 | 12,452 | 12,714 | 12,889 | 12,718 | 12,052 | 12,203 |
個人消費 | 59.5 | 58.9 | 58.8 | 59.3 | 59.0 | 59.2 | 58.7 | 58.5 | 58.8 | 60.9 | 60.7 |
政府消費 | 18.8 | 19.2 | 19.5 | 19.9 | 20.1 | 20.3 | 20.0 | 19.9 | 20.3 | 21.6 | 21.2 |
固定投資 | 20.4 | 20.5 | 21.2 | 21.0 | 21.0 | 21.1 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 20.8 | 19.3 | 19.5 |
うち機械 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.4 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 8.5 | 7.6 | 8.3 |
建設 | 9.4 | 9.7 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 10.4 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 9.7 | 9.2 |
運輸 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.1 |
輸出 | 27.1 | 27.3 | 26.4 | 25.9 | 26.5 | 26.8 | 28.0 | 28.7 | 27.8 | 24.0 | 25.8 |
輸入 | 26.2 | 26.1 | 26.0 | 26.4 | 26.9 | 27.5 | 28.6 | 29.1 | 28.2 | 25.6 | 27.9 |
純輸出 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 0.3 | -0.5 | -0.4 | -0.6 | -0.5 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -1.7 | -2.2 |
在庫 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 | -0.2 | 0.6 |
GDE | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
個人消費 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | -0.8 | -1.8 | 1.0 | |
政府消費 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.0 | -0.6 | |
固定投資 | 2.4 | 3.7 | -0.9 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 3.2 | 1.4 | -3.8 | -12.0 | 2.3 | |
うち機械 | -1.1 | 1.0 | -2.7 | 1.1 | 3.1 | 5.8 | 3.2 | -5.0 | -15.0 | 9.6 | |
建設 | 4.2 | 5.8 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.1 | -3.0 | -8.6 | -3.7 | |
運輸 | 7.6 | 4.9 | -9.3 | 1.7 | -1.8 | 3.3 | 0.5 | -2.8 | -17.2 | 8.4 | |
輸出 | 2.2 | -2.8 | -1.5 | 3.6 | 2.0 | 6.6 | 4.0 | -4.4 | -18.4 | 8.9 | |
輸入 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 6.2 | 3.3 | -4.4 | -13.8 | 10.3 | |
GDE | 1.7 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 1.4 | -1.3 | -5.2 | 1.2 |
国内総支出については構成比をみる限りあまり極端な変化が見られない。2000年に入ってからは成長率は高くて2%どまりの低成長国であった。2008年のマイナス1.3%と2009年のマイナス5.2%がイタリーの経済力の弱さを物語っている。いわゆるレーマン・ショック意向設備投資が大きく落ち込み、輸出も減った。個人消費も2008年以降は若干のマイナスになった。
表4.イタリーの雇用統計(単位:1000人、%)
2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | |
雇用者数 | 21,210 | 21,605 | 21,913 | 22,241 | 22,417 | 22,559 | 22,984 | 23,223 | 23,396 | 23,024 | 22,873 |
前年比 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 0.7 | -1.6 | -0.7 |
失業者数 | 2,388 | 2,164 | 2,062 | 2,048 | 1,957 | 1,885 | 1,679 | 1,509 | 1,690 | 1,944 | 2,105 |
前年比 | -6.7 | -9.4 | -4.7 | -0.7 | -4.5 | -3.7 | -10.9 | -10.1 | 12.0 | 15.0 | 8.3 |
失業率 | 10.1 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 8.0 | 7.7 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 7.8 | 8.4 |
雇用者数は2003年以降ほとんど増えていない。失業者数は2008年以降増え続けている。
イタリーは経済テクノクラートの新首相に交代-暗夜行路の旅(2011-11-22)
イタリーは悪名高いベルルスコーニ長期政権が倒れ、元EUコッミショナーで銀行家でもあるマリオ・モンテ(Mario Monte)68歳が新首相となった。首相は閣僚には政治家や財界人をいれず、もっぱら経済関係のテクノクラートや役人や学者を起用した。
それによってイタリー史上まれにみる真面目な政権が出来上がった。首相はどういう政策をとるかは未知数だが「引き締めによる財政再建」というのが金看板であることは間違いない。多分に銀行に配慮した政策になるであろう。
イタリーはすでにIMFの監視を受け入れることを前政権が決めている。おそらくイタリー経済は「健全化」と称するあらゆる「引き締め政策」によってますます不況感を強め、「窒息」していくであろう。消費は抑制され、輸入も減って貿易赤字は縮小していくに違いない。また「雇用法」も改定され、解雇が容易に行えるようになるであろう。結局のところ労働者や一般国民に犠牲を強いる政策になるであろうことは明らかである。
それではいつになったら国民は一息つけるのであろうか?その時期は決して近いとは言えない。IMFの政策は国民の福祉向上を目指すものではない。あくまで金融資本救済に主眼を置いている。
イタリー経済にとって必要なことは衣類や電気製品といった国内の消費財の自給率を上げるような一種の「産業政策」である。しかし、これは関税自主権をがなく「自由貿易」標榜するEU内にとどまる限り、「ありえない政策」ある。政権はまさに「暗夜行路」へと旅立った。先行きは真っ暗闇である。明るい南欧のギリシャ、イタリーそしてスペインやポルトガルまでが暗雲に閉ざされるのは正視に忍びない。何が悪かったのか?私の答えは「ユーロという共通通貨」体制と「無原則な自由貿易体制」である。
モンティ首相の新政策は引き締め強化⇒2011-12-3
モンティ政権はさっそく新経済政策を発表した。
その骨子は:①年金制度の改革、②売上税(消費税)の引き上げ、③不動産税の再導入である。
いずれも前ベルルスコーニ政権の「ポピュリズム政策」の見直しである。そのほとんどが庶民に大きな犠牲を強いる政策である。
モンティ首相はEU諸国に2013年には財政収支を均衡させる(赤字ゼロ)ことを約束くしている。これをたとえ不況が続いても断行するという。そのためにはさらに150ユーロ(約200億ドル)から300億ユーロ(約400億ドル)の歳出削減が必要である。これはこの夏に前政権が約束した600億ユーロ(約810億ドル)の削減に上乗せするものである。
これに対する労働組合の反発は当然のことながら強いものがある。首相は主要労組との話し合いを予定している。比較的穏健なCISLのラファエル・ボナンニ(Raffaele Bonanni)委員長は「今回のミーティングは単なる相談ではなく、交渉である」として早くも対決姿勢を示している。同労組の組合員は400万人おり、そのうち半分はすでに退職している。年金は重要テーマである。
左翼労組のCGILのスサンナ・カムッソ(Susanna Camusso)委員長は「改革の目的は純粋に政府の現金収入の増加でであるべきであり、40(40billion)というのは縁起が悪い数字であると」としている。CGILの組合員数は400万人を超える。実際の政府案は約300億ユーロであると伝えられる。
一番問題になったのは年金改革である。イタリーでは現在35年の年金基金を支払わないと年金がもらず、58歳から受給資格ができる。改革案では年金は42年の掛け金支払いののちでないと受給資格ができず、受け取れる年齢も年々送らされ2018年には66歳から受給できるようになるという。それにしても30歳以下の失業率が半分近いので将来的に大きな問題を引き起こす。
不動産税はベルルスコーニ政権が2008年に廃止したもので年間30~50億ユーロ(1ユーロは約1.35米ドル)あった。イタリーでは庶民は定収入の割には高価な住宅に住んでおり、不動産税の復活は生計費に打撃を与える。首相はこの点については配慮すると言明している。税務当局は不動産税の「累進課税」を検討しており、富裕層の2軒目以降の住宅についてはより高い税率を設定するという。
また、新たに「富裕税=Wealth Tax」なるものを検討しているという。具体的なイメージはわかないが政権の「改革」はもっぱら庶民に負担増を強いるものであり、労働組合からの強い反発が予想される。(記事はWSJ 2011-2-3 インターネット版などを参照しています)。
個別企業においても労働組合への攻撃が回賜されており、フィアット社は2012年1月からすべての「団体交渉による協定の破棄」を通告している。また、フィアット社は「産業連盟」(Confindustria)からの脱退も表明している。
これによって企業としてあらゆる束縛を断ち切り、労働者には大幅な賃金引下げを含む「労働条件の切り下げ」を行おうとしていることは明白である。不況下と雇用不安という客観条件を最大限にりようしようという意図である。工場の自由な閉鎖と解雇も当然視野に入っている。
労働組合はこのようなフィアットの攻勢をイタリーの産業活性化のためにはやむを得ないとして、おおむね賛成の意向といわれる。
イタリーは雇用法改正ー解雇が容易に(2012-6-28)
イタリー議会は6月27日(水)に雇用法を改正し、経営者が容易に解雇を行えるようにした。賛成393、反対73.これはヨーロッパ中央銀行が2011年にイタリー政府に対して要求していたものであった。これによって投資家の信頼感を回復し、イタリーでの投資が増えることを狙ったものだという。
モンティ首相は関係者と慎重に協議をして法改正に踏み切ったと伝えられる。モンティ首相はこの法改正が議会で承認されなければ辞任する意向であったという。
しかし、この法改正はイタリーの投資増加に直結するということはありえない。それ以前に通貨ユーロがイタリーへの投資を困難にしているからである。
イタリーでは1970年に「生涯雇用法(長期雇用法)」が制定され、これがイタリーへの産業投資を阻害してきたという俗論が最近幅を利かせてきた。しかし、長期雇用は「熟練形成」の前提になるものであり、産業投資の直接の阻害要因ではありえない。長期雇用を「罪悪」とみなす、ネオリベラルの思想は健全な資本主義経済への反逆でしかない。
イタリーの議会選挙で与党が事実上の敗北。(2013-2-27)
イタリーの議会選挙は下院では中道左派の民主党(ベルサニ党首)が29.54%を獲得し、僅差で第1党になった。前首相のベルルスコーニ氏が率いる「自由人民党」が29.18%、第3位は元コメデイアンのベッペ・グリッロ(Beppe
Grillo)氏が率いる「5つ星党」が初めての国政選挙にもかかわらず25.55%を獲得した。モンティ首相の中道勢力は10.6%にとどまった。
下院では第1党が630議席のうち54%を与えられるという規定があり、民主党が340議席となるが、ベルルスコーニ氏とグリロ氏の「ユーロの引き締め政策」に反対する勢力の得票率は55%に達している。これに対し、民主党と中道党の得票率は40%にしかすぎず、イタリー国民ははっきりとユーロの引き締め政策に「ノー」という立場を表明した。
問題は上院議会の選挙結果である。上院は得票に応じて議席が割り当てられるために、315議席のうち、民主党のベルサニ陣営は119議席、ベルルスコーニ陣営は117、「5つ星党」が54議席、モンティ陣営は18議席であり、ユーロの引き締め政策を支持する勢力の議席は137議席(119+18)にしか過ぎない。過半数の158議席には21議席足りない。
これでは下院を制したとはいえ民主党は上院では過半数が取れずおそらく内閣を組織できない。「5つ星党」は連立政権には加わらないという立場を表明しており、イタリーは3か月後に選挙のやり直しを余儀なくされる可能性が高い。ところがベルルスコーニは「再選挙はやりたくない」と言い出した。何とか民主党と連立を組みたいということのようだ。
民主党としては「悪魔と手を結んだ」といわれたくないが、再選挙をやればさらに「5つ星」党が伸びそうなので、ベルルスコーニと連立を組むかもしれない。ベルルスコーニは右翼的ブルジョアなので労働者階級に過酷な政策を強いることには反対ではない。かれは「増税」に基本的に反対なだけである。また、政治的に勢力を持てば現在進行中の汚職裁判にも有利に作用すると考えている。そういう意味ではタイのタクシン的なところもある。
ベルルスコーニは政府が「増税を緩和」すれば連立政権に加わりたいところであろう。しかし、民主党はベルルスコーニとは手を組みたくはないという立場を崩してはいない。
ベッペ・グリロの「5つ星」は増税と「緊縮政策」には反対だといういうことで一般大衆(失業者を含む)の支持を得ている。しかし、一般大衆同様、ユーロからの離脱などは全く考えていない。ただ「現状に不満」だというだけであって、民主党の「緊縮政策」には組しないが、EUやユーロ体制に絶縁状を突き付ける気は毛頭ない。
ユーロの第3位の大国イタリーがドイツが指導してきた「引き締め政策」を実施する政権が事実上の敗北を喫したことによりユーロ危機の再燃は避けられない。少なくとも大幅な方針転換を余儀なくされることになるであろう。このようなイタリーの選挙結果に対してはラテン系諸国やギリシャの国民は内心拍手を送っているに違いない。
「強固な引き締め政策」は何ら成果を出せず、国民に犠牲を強いただけに終わったことがまたも明らかになった。ユーロという通貨体制は大きな矛盾を生んだ無理な制度であった。結局、最大の受益国は工業が進んで輸出競争力の強いドイツとオランダには大きなメリットはあったが、被害を受けたラテン系諸国やギリシャは国民生活を直接脅かす結果となった。このままではもうどうにもならない。
By Giovanni Legorano
July 4,
2016 6:38 p.m. ET
MILAN—Britain’s
vote
to leave the EU has produced dire predictions for the U.K. economy.
The damage to the rest of Europe could be more immediate and potentially more
serious. Nowhere is the risk concentrated more heavily than in the Italian
banking sector.
In Italy, 17%
of banks’ loans are sour. That is nearly 10 times the level in the U.S., where,
even at the worst of the 2008-09 financial crisis, it was only 5%. Among
publicly traded banks in the eurozone, Italian lenders account for nearly half
of total bad loans.
Years
of lax lending standards left Italian banks ill-prepared when an economic slump
sent bankruptcies soaring a few years ago. At one major bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena BMPS -13.99 % SpA, bad
loans were so thick it assigned a team of 700 to deal with them and created a
new unit to house them. Several weeks ago, the bank put the bad-credit unit up
for sale, hoping a foreign partner would speed the liquidation process.
The
U.K. vote to exit the European Union has compounded the strains
on Europe’s banks in general and Italy’s in particular. It imperils the
Monte dei Paschi sale, some bankers say, and creates fresh uncertainty at a
time when lenders are struggling with ultralow
and even negative interest rates and sluggish economic growth.
Brexit
has many executives concerned that central banks will keep interest rates lower
for longer than they might otherwise, in an attempt to counteract the slower
growth—in the eurozone as well as Britain. European
banks’ stocks slid after the vote, with those in Italy especially hurt.
Shares in Monte dei Paschi are down roughly a third since the June 23
referendum.
More on Brexit and Banks
·
Brexit Exposes
Eurozone’s Weak Spot: Italy’s Banks
·
European Commission
Authorized Italian Government to Support Banks (June 30)
·
Bank Shares Drop,
as Analysts Weigh Brexit Impact (June 27)
·
Why Banks Are
Taking Brunt of Brexit Crash (June 24)
·
Brexit and Banks:
Fearful Start on a Long, Uncertain Road (June 24)
All
this threatens to spark a crisis of confidence in Italian banks, analysts say.
Although Italy has only one bank classified as globally significant under
international banking regulations—UniCredit—some analysts say bank stresses
worsened by Brexit could threaten Italy’s stability and, potentially, even that
of the EU.
“Brexit
could lead to a full-blown banking crisis in Italy,” said Lorenzo
Codogno, former director general at the Italian Treasury. “The risk of a
eurozone meltdown is clearly there if Brexit concerns are not immediately
addressed.”
Europe’s
banks were already retrenching before the U.K. vote, and markets appear fearful
many don’t have thick enough capital buffers. Even before the vote, shares were
valued at levels that signaled distress. Since June 23, an index of European
banks has dropped 17%, bringing total losses from the beginning of the year to
30%.
The
pain is greater in Europe’s periphery. Portugal’s banking system continues to
struggle with souring loans, low profitability and little investor appetite.
The country received an international bailout in 2011, but given Portugal’s
high debt, authorities held off on a cleanup of banks’ balance sheets through
the creation of a systemwide “bad bank.” That idea is being discussed now.
In
June, Spain’s Banco Popular Español
SA POP 2.47 % raised
€2.5 billion to tackle continued losses on soured property loans, a sign the
country’s weakest lenders have struggled to recover from Spain’s 2008
real-estate bust and subsequent economic downturn.
The
profitability of Italian banks has long been among the worst in Europe, weighed
down by bloated staffs and too many branches, leaving the banks with little
extra capital to cover loans that go bad. Today’s low interest rates have hit
Italian banks especially hard because of their heavy focus on plain-vanilla
lending activities, with relatively little in fee-generating activities
such as asset management and investment banking.
Test of bank rules
When
the financial crisis of late 2008 hit, Italian banks tended to roll over loans
whose borrowers weren’t repaying on time, hoping an economic upswing would take
care of the problem, say Italian bank executives.
Part
of the façade of Banca Monte dei Paschi. Investors, acutely mindful of Britain’s
vote to leave the European Union, worry about the balance sheets of Italian
banks. Photo: Giuseppe Cacace/Agence
France-Presse/Getty Images
Italian
banks’ struggles have led to the first serious test of a model the EU adopted
two years ago for handling banking woes. The Italian government has sought EU
permission to inject €40 billion into its banks to stabilize the system.
To
do so would require bending an anti-bailout rule the bloc adopted in 2014 to
force troubled banks’ stakeholders—shareholders, bondholders and some of their
depositors as well—to pay a financial price before the country’s taxpayers
must.
Rome
argues that bending this rule would be a small price to pay for erecting a
firewall against possible bank contagion stemming from Brexit. Italy’s EU
partners, led by Germany, reject the idea, leaving Rome exposed to the
potential for a banking crisis.
When
the European Central Bank began supervising the eurozone’s largest banks in
2014, things got harder. The new supervisor applied tougher criteria than the
Bank of Italy did for declaring loans impaired, say bankers. In April, it
forced one bank to take bigger write-downs to bad loans before receiving its
blessing to merge with another bank.
The
result is that impaired loans at Italian banks now exceed
€360 billion—quadruple the 2008 level—and they continue to rise.
Banks’
attempts to unload some of the bad loans have largely flopped, with the banks
and potential investors far apart on valuations. Banks have written
down nonperforming loans to about 44% of their face value, but
investors believe the true value is closer to 20% or 25%—implying an additional
€40 billion in write-downs.
One
reason for the low valuations is the enormous difficulty in unwinding a bad
loan in Italy. Italy’s sclerotic courts take eight years, on average, to clear
insolvency procedures. A quarter of cases take 12 years.
Moreover,
in many cases, the loan collateral is the family home of the owner of the
business, or it is tied up in the business itself.
“There
is a desperate need to make collateral liquid,” said Andrea Mignanelli, chief
executive of Cerved Credit Management Group. “Right now, it gets stuck in
auctions and judicial procedures that make cashing the loan very hard.”
The
Italian government has put forth a series of solutions since last fall, but
with little success so far. The proposals include incentives to encourage the
creation of a nonperforming-loan market, shorter bankruptcy procedures and new
rules to push Italy’s 400-odd cooperative banks to merge.
Brexit
has greatly compounded these problems. A slowdown in growth could cause
more bad loans to pile up, further depress bank profits and
erode already-thin capital cushions. Growth was already slowing before the
referendum; on Friday, Italy’s business lobby group Confindustria slashed
Italy’s growth forecast for this year to 0.8% from 1.4%—and to 0.6% from 1.3%
for next year—as a result of the Brexit vote.
Another
concern is that more pressure on banks’ share prices could lead some depositors
to pull out their funds. Earlier this year, Banca Monte dei Paschi saw deposit
outflows after its share price fell more than a fourth in a few days.
The
worse their loans are performing, the more capital banks have to have as a
cushion against losses. Now, “Brexit will inevitably push the banks to
strengthen their capital situation in order to cope with the volatility of the
markets and prevent further damage to their stock prices,” said Riccardo
Serrini, chief executive of Prelios Credit Servicing, a debt collector.
Strengthening
capital is a tall order in post-Brexit markets. UniCredit UNCFF -7.08 % SpA is a case in
point.
The
bank—Italy’s largest by assets—has already undertaken €74 billion in loan
write-downs and capital increases since 2008. With falling profitability
and €80 billion in nonperforming loans, its capital cushion barely meets ECB
requirements.
With
investors pummeling its shares this year, UniCredit ousted its chief executive,
Federico Ghizzoni. Last week, with its stock falling, it rushed to appoint a
new CEO, Jean-Pierre Mustier, its former head of corporate and investment
banking. In short order, Mr. Mustier must now present a convincing
restructuring plan and raise as much as €9 billion to shore up investor
confidence. UniCredit declined to comment.
The
Italian government pushed for a broad solution that would recapitalize banks
and draw a line under the bad-loans crisis, when it appealed to the EU for
permission to inject €40 billion into the lenders. The Italian government
argues that without such a recapitalization move, Italy’s banking problems
could mushroom into a broader crisis.
“There
is an epidemic, and Italy is the patient that is sickest,” said Pierpaolo
Baretta, an undersecretary at the Italian Economy Ministry. If “we don’t stop
the epidemic, it will become everybody’s problem…The shock of Brexit has
created a sense of urgency.”
Italian
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi pressed the issue in his meeting last week with
German Chancellor Angela
Merkel.
The
European Commission, with strong backing from Berlin, has dismissed the push
from the Italians. Some European officials privately expressed annoyance that
Rome has been slow to deal with its banking problem and is paying the price in
such volatile markets. Now, they say, the Italians are using Brexit to press
for permission to bend the rules of a hard-fought banking regime.
“We
worked to set down certain rules about bank resolution and bank
recapitalization,” Ms. Merkel said last week in Brussels. “We can’t do
everything again every two years. We put a lot of effort into that.”
Instead,
EU officials say bank supervisors might need to declare some lenders insolvent
and impose losses on investors first.
Rome
has criticized the EU’s new banking regime and doesn’t want to use “bail-in”
rules that prescribe the order in which stakeholders must bear losses for
winding down an ailing bank, in part because of the peculiarities of the
Italian banking system. About €187 billion of bank bonds are in the hands of
retail investors, whose holdings would be wiped out by a bank resolution under
the new rules.
Last
year, more than 100,000 investors in four small Italian banks that were wound
up saw their investments wiped out. Some lost their life savings. The
controversy exploded in December after Italian news media reported that a
retiree committed suicide after losing €110,000 in savings invested in one of
the banks.
Such
problems carry little truck in Brussels. “Every grandmother has bought bank
shares,” said one EU official. “That’s how it’s presented to us…. This work has
to be done within the rules, using all the flexibility there is.”